

ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS

OF BANCO COMERCIAL PORTUGUÊS, S.A.

22.05.2025

Proposal in connection with **item 6** of the agenda

To resolve upon the updating of the Policy for the Remuneration of Members of the Management and Supervisory Bodies

Considering that:

- i) Pursuant to Article 115-C of the Legal Framework for Credit Institutions and Financial Companies and Article 14 of the Bank's Articles of Association, the Remunerations and Welfare Board (CRP) and the Nominations and Remunerations Committee (CNR) are responsible for submitting to the General Meeting of Shareholders the proposal to update the Remuneration Policy applicable to Members of the Management and Supervisory Bodies (MMSBs);
- ii) In the context of its activity, the CNR, as usual, hired an independent external entity to carry out a benchmarking and compliance analysis of the Bank's remuneration policies and practices, assessing the suitability of the current remuneration structure in relation to best market practices, as well as the applicable legal and regulatory requirements;
- iii) From this analysis it emerged that the policy currently in force is broadly in line with market practice and complies with the applicable legislation;
- iv) Nevertheless, opportunities for improvement and clarification were identified with regard to simplifying the structure for defining variable remuneration and the respective performance indicators and other details of the text, which were considered beneficial for a better understanding of the Policy applicable during 2025;
- v) Additionally, given that 2025 will be a year for selecting and defining the composition of the management and supervisory bodies for the 2026-2029 term of office and that the current Long-Term Variable Remuneration (LTVR) period applicable to the executive members of the Board of Directors expires at the end of 2025, the CNR and the CRP have henceforth decided to propose to the General Meeting the definition of the LTVR model for the subsequent period so that the remuneration framework for the next executive members is defined;
- vi) This approach reflects a logic of planning, responsibility and institutional coherence, and reaffirms the Bank's commitment to maintaining a responsible, transparent remuneration policy guided by objective criteria, designed to attract, retain and motivate top talent;

the CRP and the CNR propose that the following changes be approved, embodied in the consolidated version of the Remuneration Policy applicable to Members of the Management and Supervisory Bodies attached hereto, in which the changes are duly marked (except, with a view to ensuring the document's legibility, merely formal adjustments):

A. Remuneration Policy for Members of the Management and Supervisory Bodies for 2025:

In addition to wording clarifications and other formal adjustments to the text that are not identified here because they are not material and make reading difficult, the changes identified below:

1. General Principles

Explicit clarification that the variable remuneration of the members of the management board is based on a logic of commitment and shared responsibility for the results reached by the Bank and that the remuneration practices are neutral, ensuring equal pay for work of equal value, regardless of gender (Basic Principles, paragraph g)).

2. Structure and Attribution of Variable Remuneration

- a) Introduction of a simplification of the structure under which the attribution of Variable Remuneration is no longer dependent on two performance evaluation steps - evaluation of Corporate KPIs, followed by a performance evaluation of the members) and there is now only one individual evaluation that incorporates common corporate objectives and specific objectives (quantitative and qualitative) of each member of the Executive Committee (arts. 8(2), 9(6) and 7), being explicit that the variable remuneration has a possible and discretionary nature, in accordance with the terms of the Policy, and that its payment in a certain year does not grant to the mentioned members the right to any future granting. There is no material change, but rather a change of process;
- b) Change in the maximum variable remuneration applicable to the Chief Risk Officer, which may reach up to 150% of the fixed component (previously limited to 100%), maintaining a clearly lower variable remuneration ratio than that applicable to the other executive members of the Board of Directors, since the legal limit of 200% of the fixed component applies to them (article 8(15)). Considering the Bank's financial performance and the effective evolution of the performance of its control functions, it was felt that there was no justification for differentiating this function from the others. In any case, the Chief Risk Officer's evaluation criteria continue to guarantee independence from the Bank's performance and favour qualitative indicators, as well as quantitative indicators related to compliance with behavioural and prudential rules;

- c) Definition of the overall AVR limit for Executive Committee members at 1.00% of the BCP Group's net income, with its attribution conditional on achieving at least 80% of the budgeted net income, ensuring greater clarity in the maximum and minimum limits applicable (article 9(1));
- d) Update of the AVR calculation formula, with a reduction in the weighting of individual quantitative objectives to 70% (previously 80%) and an increase in qualitative objectives to 30% (previously 20%). In the case of the CRO, the weights are now 65% and 35% (previously 70% and 30%), respectively (art. 9(5)). This change takes into account the uncertainty of the current macroeconomic context, given the high volatility of the market, as well as the greater emphasis on sustainability criteria, balancing quantitative objectives, focused on financial performance, with qualitative ones, now more orientated towards leadership skills and social and environmental responsibility;
- e) Introduction of more complete information on the structure of common corporate KPIs, including their relative weighting, seeking to align with shareholder expectations (art. 9(7));

Category		Corporate KPIs	Weight
Capital	15%	Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio (fully implemented) – Group	10%
		MREL-TREA (%) – Portugal Resolution Group	5%
Profitability	40%	Return On Equity– Group	40%
Risk	10%	NPE ratio – Group	5%
		Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) (%) - Group	5%
Evolution	35%	Digital Transformation (% of mobile active customers in total active customers) – Group	10%
		Customer Satisfaction – BCP PT	10%
		Business Volumes – Group	10%
		Sustainability Master Plan – Group	5%

- f) A change in the AVR deferral criterion, whereby it is proposed that the mandatory deferral rule of 60% will now occur when the AVR value is equal to or greater than the Annual Fixed Remuneration (previously: two thirds) (art. 9(15));
- g) Expected updating of the value of the deferred component of the AVR paid in cash, through the accounting of interest calculated at the 12-month Euribor rate (on the date of the last working day of March of the year of payment), plus

0.25%, starting on the date the AVR is attributed. This proposal is in line with the international practices of listed banks and guarantees that the deferred value is updated over time under market conditions (article 9(16));

3. Attribution of Long-Term Variable Remuneration

- a) Introduction of information on the LTVR KPIs applicable to the 2022-2025 term, reinforcing transparency in the way they are calculated and clarifying that this type of remuneration has a possible and discretionary nature, in accordance with the terms of the Policy:

Categories		KPIs
Strategic Plan	50%	Alignment with the Group's Strategic Plan: i) Component 1 (with 75% of the weight) - Period 2022-2024: degree of achievement of the objectives of the Strategic Plan 2021-2024; ii) Component 2 (with 25% of the weight) - Year 2025: degree of achievement of the objectives of the Strategic Plan 2025-2028 for the year 2025.
Total Shareholder Return	50%	Performance, measured between 31-12-2021 and 31-12-2025, of the Total Shareholder Return (TSR) of the Bank's shares compared to the TSR resulting from the weighted average TSR of the market indices, calculated as follows: i) TSR of the PSI Index, weighted at 30%; ii) TSR of the Stoxx Europe 600 Banks Index, weighted at 70%.

- b) Change to the LTVR deferral criterion under the terms of section 2.f) above (art. 10(9)).

4. Benefits and Supplementary Scheme

- a) Clarification that the benefits awarded (health insurance, mobile phone, credit card, and a life insurance may also be awarded) are adjusted to the responsibilities and functional requirements of each position and principles of fairness, clarifying what was in the previous wording (art. 13);
- b) Clarification that the Bank's annual contribution to the retirement plan may correspond to between 20% and 30% of the gross annual fixed remuneration, if so defined by the CRP (art. 14(5)).

B. Long-term Variable Remuneration Structure for the 2026-2029 Term of Office:

Notwithstanding the fact that the Remuneration Policy for Members of the Management and Supervisory Bodies for 2026 will only be approved at next year's Annual General Meeting and without prejudice to other changes to the Policy that

may be proposed, the following changes to the LTVR structure for the next term of office are hereby proposed:

1. Maintenance of the performance KPIs introduced in the 2025 Policy and identified in Section A above;
2. Definition of a three-year LTVR Evaluation Period - from 1 January 2026 to 31 December 2028 - ensuring alignment between the incentive model and the period of the recently approved Strategic Plan, moving away from the model traditionally associated with the duration of the term of office (2026-2029).

Lisbon, April 29, 2025

Nominations and Remunerations Committee

Remunerations and Welfare Board



Banco Comercial Português, S.A.

Remuneration Policy of Members of the Management and Supervisory Bodies 2025

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REMUNERATION POLICY OF MEMBERS OF THE MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISORY BODIES 2025

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Basic Principles

This Remuneration Policy applies to the Members of the Management and Supervisory Bodies (MMSB) of Banco Comercial Português, S.A. ("BCP" or "Bank") and was made in compliance with the provisions of the Group Regulation GR0042 on remuneration policies and is based on a number of principles that aim to ensure:

- a) A governance model able to promote the alignment of the interests of all stakeholders, namely in what concerns to compliance with the strategy defined for the Bank, the sustainability of short, medium and long-term earnings and a prudent management of risk;
- b) A competitive fixed remuneration that attracts and retains competent professionals and a variable remuneration intended to stimulate individual and Group performance, in a logic of commitment and shared responsibility for the results achieved at a global level, awarding the MMSB in the same measure of the success of the organization, and to reward results achieved in line with the Bank's current and future risk profile and tolerance;
- c) The ~~attribution~~ Granting of benefits, namely in what concerns the retirement benefits, aligned with market practices;
- d) The compliance with the applicable regulations and guidelines in terms of procedures and remuneration policy;
- e) Conduct and commercial practices in line with the interests and needs of the Group's Customers;
- f) Alignment of the criteria used to assess the Bank's performance and the calculation of the variable remuneration amounts of the different Bank's Remuneration Policies;
- ~~f)g)~~ Neutral remuneration practices, ensuring equal pay for equal work or work of equivalent value, regardless of gender.

For that purpose, the Nominations and Remunerations Committee (CNR) is responsible for the definition and annual revision of the guiding principles of the Remuneration Policy of the MMSB and for submitting that Policy, jointly with the Remuneration and Welfare Board (CRP), for approval by the General Meeting of Shareholders of the Bank.

It is the responsibility of the Risk Assessment Committee (CAvR) to examine if the incentives established in the Bank's Remuneration Policy of the MMSB take into consideration the risk, capital, liquidity and expectations concerning income at any given time.

Whenever the CNR does not have, at least, one Member of the CAvR in its composition, it must indicate one representative to participate in the meetings of the CNR having a

final version of the Remuneration Policy in the Agenda or whenever the CNR deems it relevant, given the issues under discussion.

For the making of the proposal on the Remuneration Policy and supervision of its implementation the CNR must obtain an opinion from the CRP and get contributions and support from BCP's different management areas of which the following should be highlighted:

- a) The Risk Office, which should be involved to ensure that limits are not exceeded in terms of risk, capital, and liquidity of the Bank, contributing for the definition of the measures for implementing the variable remuneration based on risk, namely ex ante and ex post measures and verify if the variable remuneration structure is in line with the Group's risk profile and culture;
- b) The Human Resources Division, which should contribute to the preparation and evaluation of the Policy for the Remuneration of Employees, namely regarding the structure and levels of remuneration and estimation of the amounts of AVR to attribute, taking into account strategic and budgetary goals, [employees' profile](#), retention strategies and market conditions.
- c) The Compliance Office, which must analyse to what extent the principles and practices of the Remuneration Policy may affect BCP's Group capacity to comply with the legislation, regulations, norms, internal requirements and the respect for the company's culture, as well as the absence of conflicts of interest, reporting to the CRP and to the CNR any anomalous situation which may jeopardize or compromise that compliance;
- d) The Audit Division, which must develop annual independent mechanisms for the validation /revision of the design of the Remuneration Policy and also for its implementation, calculation and respective effects.

In the independent analysis for the implementation of the Remuneration Policy, the CNR, with the support from the Audit Division, verifies the implementation and compliance with the remuneration policies and procedures adopted and will communicate its conclusions to the CRP.

While making the proposal for the Remuneration Policy, the CNR follows clear and transparent procedures, which are documented, ~~the documents regarding the making of the proposal and decisions being kept~~ by means of minutes of meetings, reports and other relevant documents, [concerning the proposals and the decisions](#).

The CNR may hire independent and qualified experts and external consultants for support, to assist one or more of its members in the performance of its functions and that contribute and support the performance of its duties.

It is considered essential that the fixed remuneration represents a sufficiently high

portion of the total remuneration so as to ensure the adequate balance between the fixed and variable components of the total remuneration.

The variable remuneration criteria are in line with the strategy defined for the Bank and with the Bank's objectives, values and long-term interests. This way, the Bank guarantees a sustainable performance, adjusted to its risk profile.

In accordance with these principles, the granting of a variable remuneration is linked to the performance and the sustainable growth of the Bank's income and adequacy of its capital ratios, as well as to the market conditions and the possible risks, current and future, able of affecting the business. This way, the Bank is able to guarantee a model that is financially sustainable and does not jeopardise the institution, its depositors, employees, shareholders and remaining stakeholders.

The remuneration earned by the Director responsible for Risk and Compliance reflects the need to guarantee a greater independence *versus* the Bank's performance. Therefore, the Bank must privilege qualitative indicators as well as quantitative ones related with the compliance with the behavioural and prudential rules in the calculation of the variable remuneration,

The definition of deferral deadlines for the variable remuneration payment and the payment of a significant part of its value in Bank shares or Other Instruments is aimed at ensuring that individual performance is in line with the Bank's long-term and sustainability objectives, adapted to its risk profile.

There are also mechanisms for reducing (Malus) or reversing (Clawback) all or part of the variable remuneration, in order to comply with legal and regulatory requirements, as well as to observe the recommendations and guidelines issued by the competent entities.

Article 1 (Object)

This Policy establishes the rules for the granting of annual fixed, annual variable and long-term variable remuneration and other benefits attributable to the Members of the Company's Corporate Bodies, including the Retirement Supplement Regime.

Article 2 (Definitions)

The following expressions and acronyms, when capitalized, shall have the following meaning:

- i) **AFR** – Annual fixed remuneration
- ii) **AFR Autonomous Document** – Document containing the specific amounts of the remuneration of the different Members of the Corporate Bodies, approved by the CRP
- iii) **AVR** – Annual variable remuneration

- iv) **AVR Attribution Granting Date** – Corresponds to the date of the CRP meeting in which the AVR is fixed
- v) **AVR Attribution Granting Price** – Corresponds to the average of the closing prices of the BCP shares or other instruments, as applicable, recorded in the previous 20 stock-exchange sessions preceding the AVR Attribution Granting Date, or the closing price of the third business day prior to the AVR Payment Date, if lower than the average previously defined
- vi) **AVR Evaluation Period** – Period of time from January 1 until 31 December 2025
- vii) **AVR Payment Date** – Corresponds to a date up to the date of payment of the fixed remuneration, in the month following the approval of the financial statements by the Annual General Meeting
- viii) **BCP, Bank or Company** – Banco Comercial Português, S.A.
- ix) **CAUD** – Audit Committee
- x) **CEO** – Chairperson of the Executive Committee
- xi) **CNR** – Nominations and Remunerations Committee
- xii) **CAvR** – Risk Assessment Committee
- xiii) **CRO** – Chief Risk Officer
- xiv) **CRP** – Remuneration and Welfare Board
- xv) **EBA** – [European Banking Authority](#)
- xvi) **Group or BCP Group** – Includes the Company and all the companies in a control or group relationship with the Company and Millenniumbcp Prestação de Serviços ACE
- xvii) **LTRV Attribution Granting Price** – Corresponds to the average of the closing prices of the BCP shares or other instruments, as applicable, recorded in the 20 stock – exchange sessions preceding the LTRV Attribution Granting Date, or the closing price of the third business day prior to the LTRV Attribution Granting Date, if lower than the average previously defined
- xviii) **LTRV** – Long-term variable remuneration
- xix) **LTRV Attribution Granting Date** – Corresponds to the date of the CRP meeting in which the LTRV is fixed
- xx) **LTRV Evaluation Period** – Period of time from January 1, 2022 to December 31, 2025
- xxi) **LTRV Payment Date** – Corresponds to a date up to the date of payment of the fixed remuneration, in the month following the approval of the financial statements by the

Annual General Meeting

- xxii) **MMSB** – Members of the Management and Supervisory Bodies
- xxiii) **Other Instruments** – Other additional Tier 1 or Tier 2 equity instruments or other instruments that can be fully converted into core Tier 1 equity instruments or whose value can be reduced to the extent that they adequately reflect the Bank's credit quality and are appropriate for the payment of variable remuneration
- xxiv) **PSI – Portuguese stock index** – PSI Index, composed of the companies chosen, at each moment, by the competent bodies of Euronext Lisbon – Sociedade Gestora de Mercados Regulamentados, S.A.
- xxv) **Retirement Supplement** – The Retirement Supplement regime due to old age or disability to be paid by the Company, foreseen in article 17 of the Company's Articles of Association
- xxvi) **Stoxx Europe 600 Banks Index (SX7P)** – Index of shares composed by large European Banks
- xxvii) **Target AVR** – Annual variable remuneration corresponding to 100% compliance with the quantitative and qualitative objectives mentioned in the VR Autonomous Document
- xxviii) **Target LTVR** – Long-term variable remuneration corresponding to 100% compliance with the objectives mentioned in the VR Autonomous Document
- xxix) **TSR** – Total shareholder return, estimated by means of the following equation the data of which are obtained through an independent and recognized market information platform (ex: Bloomberg or Reuters):
$$\frac{[(\text{Average of the closing prices of the shares for the two months prior to the end of the evaluation period} - \text{Average of the closing prices of the shares for the two months prior to the beginning of the evaluation period}) + \text{Dividends per share paid to the shareholders in that period}]}{\text{Average of the closing prices of the shares for the two months prior to the beginning of the evaluation period, adjusting stock prices to reflect the effects of share capital increases, incorporation of reserves or similar}}$$
- xxx) **VR Autonomous Document** – Document containing the calculation formulas, indicators or indexes to be used for the purpose of determining the AVR and LTVR, approved by the CNR and the CRP

Chapter I - Members of the Management and Supervisory Bodies

Article 3 (Exercise of functions and termination conditions)

1. The MMSB exercise their functions during the period of the mandate for which they have been elected by the General Meeting of Shareholders or, in the case of co-optation,

to the remaining period of the current mandate.

2. If any of the MMSB intends to cease functions, resigning from his/her position, this will only take effect by the end of the month following the communication of his/her intention, and the Board of Directors may, with the favourable opinion of the CAUD, dismiss this pre-notice, without any indemnity payment.
3. If a MMSB is dismissed under the terms of the applicable Law without just cause, the amount of compensation due must correspond at least to the remuneration due until the end of the mandate, and the MMSB concerned may waive all or part of this compensation. If the termination of functions is based on just cause, there will be no indemnity payment.

Article 4 (Annual fixed Remuneration, variable remuneration and benefits)

1. The CRP is responsible for setting the remuneration and benefits of the MMSB and the Members of the Board of the General Meeting.
2. The Members of the Executive Committee and the Non-executive Directors exercising functions under an exclusive regime, are also entitled to the benefits foreseen in article 13.

Chapter II - Members of the Board of the General Meeting

Article 5 (Annual fixed remuneration)

The Members of the Board of the General Meeting of the Company are entitled to an annual fixed remuneration established by the CRP, which is included in the AFR Autonomous Document, paid in four quarterly payments and to the health insurance for Corporate Bodies subscribed by the Bank at each moment.

Chapter III - Non-executive Members of the Board of Directors

Article 6 (Annual fixed remuneration)

1. The Non-executive Members of the Board of Directors of the Company are entitled to an annual fixed remuneration, which is included in the RFA Autonomous Document, paid in 12 monthly payments and to the health insurance subscribed by the Bank at each moment for its Employees and Executive Directors.
2. The CRP may, at its own request, decide not to award remuneration to Non-executive Member(s) of the Board of Directors of the Company who are related to shareholders with qualifying holdings.

Chapter IV - Executive Members of the Board of Directors

Article 7 (Annual fixed remuneration)

1. The Members of the Executive Committee are entitled to an annual fixed remuneration

paid in 14 monthly instalments and included in the AFR Autonomous Document.

2. The Retirement Supplement due to old age and disability mentioned in article 13 does not have a discretionary nature; therefore, it is a fixed remuneration.

Article 8 (Variable remuneration)

1. The Members of the Executive Committee may also earn a variable remuneration, resulting of a component attributed by reference to the annual financial year (AVR) and by a long-term component (LTVR) attributed by reference to the term of office.
2. The granting and setting of variable remuneration has a discretionary and possible nature, in accordance with the terms of this Policy, and are based on the results achieved by the Bank and on the execution rate of the ~~assessment of common~~ corporate KPIs and specific KPIs ~~Corporate and Individual performance KPIs~~ of each Member of the Executive Committee and is the responsibility of the CRP, on a proposal from the CNR, having obtained the opinion of the CAVR on matters within its remit, for the purposes of the provisions of the Basic Principles above. The circumstance of having been granted on a certain year does not give rise to any future rights to a granting to the members of the Executive Committee.
3. The definition of corporate and specific KPIs, ~~on the basis of which the performance of the Members of the Executive Committee is assessed,~~ is ~~made~~ a competence of ~~by~~ the CNR, after consulting the CAVR and is carried out based on the Bank's strategic goals, key risk indicators being also considered as an integral part of the definition process, so as to ensure an alignment of the risk profile of the Members of the Executive Committee with the risk level tolerated by the Bank.
4. The variable remuneration of the CRO privileges qualitative and quantitative indicators related with the compliance with the prudential and behavioural rules, as well as the evolution of the Bank's risk profile.
5. The calculation process of the variable remuneration, with the purpose of its subsequent approval, must be concluded by the end of March, and for this process, the amount of the annual variable remuneration to be attributed to the Bank's Employees must also be taken into account.

Payment in shares or Other Instruments

6. The portion of the variable remuneration that is not paid in cash (see articles 9 and 10) will preferably be paid in BCP shares, unless duly justified the payment in other instruments in accordance with the Bank's long-term interests and by decision of the CRP, after discussion and favourable opinion of the CNR.
7. The number of shares of the Company or Other Instruments to be attributed to each Member of the Executive Committee results from the quotient between the Variable Remuneration value and the AVR ~~Attribution~~ Granting Price or the LTVR

Attribution Granting Price, as applicable. In any case, the dividends relating to the shares attributed, or income from Other Instruments attributed, as applicable, to a Member of the Executive Committee, but not paid because they belong to the deferred component, are not due and will not be paid by the Company to the Director.

8. Unless expressly requested by the beneficiary Director, the number of shares or Other Instruments to be delivered to comply with the provisions of the previous paragraph will correspond to the amount payable in shares or Other Instruments gross of income tax (IRS).
9. The Company's shares or Other Instruments awarded as Variable Remuneration, pursuant to no. 8 above, are subject to a retention policy for a period of one year from the respective AVR Payment Date or LTVR Payment Date, as applicable.
10. If the Member of the Executive Committee is not elected for a new term of office, the unavailability regime foreseen in the previous number shall continue to be in effect.
11. Notwithstanding the provisions of no. 9, the Member of the Executive Committee may sell or encumber the shares or Other Instruments, in an amount necessary to cover all taxes and contributions payable arising from the allocation of shares or Other Instruments. As an alternative, the Director will be able to choose the sell-to-cover regime, through which the number of shares or Other Instruments that will be delivered to him/her will already be deducted from the number of shares or Other Instruments which must be sold to pay the taxes and contributions corresponding to the total value of the shares or Other Instruments attributed.

Limitations and constraints

12. The variable remuneration may not be attributed by decision from the CRP in exceptional cases, or be conditionally postponed, namely if, after hearing the CNR and the CAVR, one of the following situations arises: (i) there is no solid capital base; (ii) its **attribution Granting** could unduly limit the Company's ability to strengthen its own capital or (iii) the **attribution Granting** of the same does not observe the applicable legislation, regulations and guidelines. The CRP, having heard the CNR and CAVR, may decide not to take into account, for the purposes of the above-mentioned situations, the extraordinary operations which, due to their size and/or impact, affect capital.
13. The sum of the annual and pluri-annual variable remuneration parts of the Executive Committee Members due in each year may not exceed, the amount laid down in the Bank's articles of association.
14. No guaranteed variable remuneration shall be granted, except when hiring a new Executive Committee Member and, in that case, only in the first year of activity and it will only be granted by the CRP after consulting the CAUD and the CAVR, and having verified that the institution has a solid and strong capital base.
15. The variable component of the remuneration is associated with performance, so its

1. Without prejudice of article 8 (2), the maximum overall value of the AVR to be attributed granted to all Executive Committee Members is subject to a maximum amount, calculated under the terms defined in the VR Autonomous Document and on no. 4 of this article, and its overall value may not exceed is 1,00% of the BCP Group's net income for the year to which the AVR refers. The attribution Granting of the AVR is in any case conditional on the fulfilment of at least 80% of the budgeted net income. Should the sum of the individual ~~AVR annual variable remunerations~~ exceed the calculated maximum overall value, an adjustment factor will be applied to the calculated individual values so that the total does not exceed the maximum ~~calculated overall value mentioned above.~~
2. The individual AVR considers the following values (without prejudice to the provisions of article 8 (4) and (5) and (16) and (17):
 - i) AVR Target – 54% of the respective AFR ~~(corresponding to 60% of the sum of the AVR Target and LTVR Target);~~
 - ii) Maximum value of the AVR under the terms of the model ~~calculated in accordance with the provisions of the VR Autonomous Document~~ – 75% of the respective AFR.
3. The CRP, articulating with the CNR and after consulting the CAVR and the CAUD, to address any current or future risks, cost of own funds and liquidity required by the BCP Group, to reflect exceptional factors affecting the Bank's performance, to incorporate the relative performance vis-à-vis its peers, in Portugal, or to contribute to the cohesion of the Body, may:
 - i) Adjust the individual values of the AVR resulting from the application of the percentages provided for in the previous number, in compliance with the legally established limits and in terms that do not affect the maximum calculated AVR, and/or;
 - ii) Apply an adjustment factor to the calculated maximum value of the AVR, calculated in accordance with the AVR model provided for in paragraph 2 of this article, with a minimum of -25% and a maximum of +25%.
4. Any adjustment made pursuant to the preceding paragraph shall be the subject of a written statement of grounds recorded in the minutes.
5. The calculation of the AVR amount is based on the results of the performance evaluation throughout the AVR Evaluation Period in question and results from the sum of two autonomous and independent components:
 - i) ~~70~~80% of the amount is based on the evaluation of the level of achievement of the individual quantitative objectives, except for the CRO whose percentage is ~~65~~70%;

- ii) ~~3020%~~ of the amount is based on the performance evaluation of each Director regarding the qualitative objectives, except for the CRO whose percentage is ~~350%~~;
6. The KPIs, including the respective values and weights, ~~Corporate KPIs (used for the definition of the calculated maximum value)~~ are established, each year, by the CNR, after listening to the CRP and the CAVR, based on the Business Plan or Budget for the respective period, previously approved by the Board of Directors ~~and will be part of the Autonomous Document, together with the respective values and weights.~~
7. The KPIs should be in line with the goals of the Strategic Plan and consider the risk appetite defined by the Bank and the capital and liquidity plans. For each Executive Committee Member, common ~~Corporate~~ KPIs ~~being are set for,~~ regarding the Bank's global performance, and individual-specific KPIs for each ~~Director of them,~~ adjusted to their respective areas of responsibility. ~~under the provisions of the Corporate KPIs chapter of the VR Autonomous Document.~~ The common corporate KPIs have the following structure:

Category		Common Corporate KPIs	Weight
Capital	15%	Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio (fully implemented) – Group	10%
		MREL-TREA (%) – Portugal Resolution Group	5%
Profitability	40%	Return On Equity – Group	40%
Risk	10%	NPE ratio – Group	5%
		Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) (%) – Group	5%
Evolution	35%	Digital Transformation (% mobile active customers in the total of active customers) – Group	10%
		Customer Satisfaction – BCP PT	10%
		Business Volumes – Group	10%
		Sustainability Master Plan Execution Level – Group	5%

8. The calculation of the AVR amounts shall be made by the Human Resources Division and shall be audited by the Audit Division and, pursuant to a resolution adopted by the CRP or the CNR, may be validated by an external independent entity.
9. The ~~attribution~~granting of the AVR depends on the performance recorded for each quantitative KPI, being calculated as follows (without prejudice to article 8 (16) and (17)):

Performance of the KPI Fixed	Amount to be attributed calculated according to the Target AVR range of the Fixed KPI according to the table in the VR Autonomous Document
Less than 80%	No AVR shall be attributed for that quantitative objective
Between 80% and 90%	Amount between 70% to 80%
Between 90% and 110%	Amount between 80% to 120%
Between 110% and 150%	Amount between 120% to 150%
150% or more	The amount corresponding to 150% of the AVR

10. The AVR attributed to each Executive Committee Member due to the quantitative KPIs results from the following equation: percentage of the Target AVR based on the performance in accordance with the provision of no. 2 i) above.
11. The qualitative evaluation of the Members of the Executive Committee is the CNR's responsibility, after hearing the Non-executive Chairperson and Vice-Chairpersons of the Board of Directors and the Chairperson of the Executive Committee, who will only decide on the other Members of the Executive Committee.
12. The weighted annual assessment of the qualitative objectives will be measurable and determined according to a grid drawn up under the terms of the VR Autonomous Document.
13. The global performance of the qualitative objectives of each Executive Committee Member results from the weighted average of the objectives ~~set forth in the VR Autonomous Document (rounded to the unit)~~, with the weight mentioned in no. 5, ii) of this article and according to the following parameters:

Global performance of qualitative objectives	Amount to be attributed calculated according to the Target AVR range of that objective according to the table in the VR Autonomous Document
Lower than level 2 - " Not Observed/Unsatisfactory Somewhat Lower than Expected "	No excess regarding the AVR will be calculated, as such
Between level 2 - " Somewhat Lower than Expected" and level 3 "Meets the Expected"	Amount between 60% to 100%
Between level 3 - "Meets the Expected" and level 4 " Outstanding Above the Expected "	Amount between 100% to 130%

14. The AVR will be paid 50% in cash and 50% in shares or Other Instruments, on the AVR Payment Date, both in the deferred and non-deferred components.
15. The AVR will be deferred by 50% over a period of 5 years, one fifth of which will be paid in each year, on the AVR Payment Date, with the payment to be made 50% in cash and 50% in shares of the Company or Other Instruments, both in the deferred and non-deferred components. If the AVR equals or exceeds ~~two-thirds of~~ the AFR of each Member, 60% of that amount must be paid in a deferred manner. If the AVR, considered alone or together with the LTVR paid in the same year, is equal to or less than € 50,000.00 and this sum does not represent more than one third of the Director's total annual remuneration, the AVR payment will be 100% in cash and there will be no deferral.
- ~~15.~~16. For the deferred component of the AVR paid in cash, interest is due at the AVR Payment Date, calculated at the interest rate Euribor 12 months (of the last workday of March of the year of payment) plus 0.25%, from the AVR Attribution Granting Date.
- ~~16.~~17. In the event of the end-of-office of the Member of the Executive Committee, for any reason, other than dismissal with just cause, after the end of the evaluation period but before the AVR payment, the AVR corresponding to that evaluation period will be paid in full, in compliance with the deferment periods and composition (cash, shares or Other Instruments).
- ~~17.~~18. The AVR payment corresponding to the evaluation period in which the Member of the Executive Committee ceases functions will not be due, except if such cessation occurs by mutual agreement, retirement, death, disability or in any other case of termination of term-of-office for a reason not attributable or unrelated to the Member of the Executive Committee, namely change of control of the Company, among others, following a takeover bid, in which cases there will be a proposal for the ~~attribution~~granting of the AVR *pro-rata temporis* – after resolution by the CRP, after hearing the CNR – and the maximum amount of the compensation shall consider the AVR average of the last 3 years, or a lower number of years if the Director has been in office for a period of less than 3 years.
- ~~18.~~19. In case a new Executive Committee Member initiates their functions in the middle of the term, they are entitled to a *pro rata temporis* of the AVR.

Article 10 (Long-term variable remuneration)

1. Without prejudice to its discretionary and possible nature, in accordance with the terms of this Policy, ~~t~~The LTVR to be attributed is based on the results of the performance evaluation during the LTVR Evaluation Period and is measured based on the following KPIs:

Category		KPIs
Strategic Plan	50%	<p><u>Alignment with the Group's Strategic Plan:</u></p> <p>Component 1 (75% weight) - 2022-2024 Period: <u>execution level of the objectives of the Strategic Plan 2021-2024;</u></p> <p>Component 2 (25% weight) - Year 2025: <u>execution level of the objectives of the Strategic Plan 2025-2028 for that year 2025.</u></p>
Total Shareholder Return	50%	<p><u>Performance, assessed comparing 31 December 2021 with 31 December 2025, of the Total Shareholders Return (TSR) of the shares of the Bank compared with the market indexes weighted average TSR, calculated as follows:</u></p> <p>i) <u>The TSR of the PSI - Index with a 30% weight;</u></p> <p>ii) <u>The TSR of the Stoxx Europe 600 Banks Index with a 70% weight.</u></p>

2. The LTVR is paid, on the LTVR Payment Date, exclusively by the ~~attribution~~ **Granting** of shares of the Company or Other Instruments, taking into consideration the following benchmark values (Target) and maximum limits [without prejudice to the provisions of article 8 (13)(14)]:
 - i) LTVR Target – 36% of the respective AFR of the LTVR Evaluation Period (~~corresponding to 40% of the sum of the Target AVR and Target LTVR~~);
 - ii) Maximum value of the LTVR under the terms of the model ~~in accordance with the provisions of the Autonomous Document VR~~ – 50% of the respective AFR of the LTVR evaluation period.
3. The CRP, in articulation with the CNR and after consulting the CAVR and the CAUD, may, namely, address any current or future risks, cost of own funds and liquidity required by the BCP Group, as well as to translate the Bank's exceptional performances:
 - i) Adjust the individual values of the LTVR resulting from the application of the percentages provided for in the previous paragraph, in compliance with the legally established limits and in terms that do not affect the maximum calculated LTVR, and/or;
 - ii) Apply an adjustment factor to the calculated maximum amount of the LTVR calculated in accordance the model provided for in paragraph 2 of this article, with a minimum of -25% and a maximum of +25%.
4. Any adjustment made pursuant to the preceding paragraph shall be the subject of a written statement of grounds recorded in the minutes.
5. The calculation of the number of shares or Other Instruments corresponding to the

LTVR to attribute is based on the results of the performance evaluation made during the LTVR Evaluation Period and is determined in accordance with the VR Autonomous Document.

6. The ~~attribution~~granting of the LTVR regarding the performance foreseen in the previous paragraph depends on the achievement level of the ~~objectives~~KPIs set on 31 December 2025.
7. The performance evaluation components are of a quantitative nature and are established by the CNR, after listening to the CRP and contained in the VR Autonomous Document.
8. In case there is an operation changing the perimeter of BCP with relevant impact and the Board of Directors approves the alteration of the objectives of the Strategic Plan, the evaluation components must be revised accordingly by the CNR, after hearing the CRP.
9. The LTVR shall be deferred by 50% over a period of 5 years and one fifth shall be paid in each year, on the LTVR Payment Date. If the LTVR is, regarding each Member, equal to or greater than ~~two-thirds of~~ the AFRs due for the LTVR Evaluation Period, the deferred amount shall be 60%. If the sum of the LTVR with the AVR paid in the same year is equal or lower than €50,000.00 and that sum does not represent more than one third of the total annual remuneration of the Director, the LTVR payment will not be deferred.
10. The LTVR payment requires the full exercise of the term of office or the remaining term of office for which the Executive Committee Member was appointed, except in situations of mutual agreement dismissal, retirement, death, disability or any other cause for an early cessation of the term of office due to a cause not attributable or unrelated to the Executive Committee Member, namely a change in the control of the Company, among others, following a takeover bid, in which cases there will be a proposal to allocate the LTVR *pro rata temporis*, after deliberation by the CRP, after hearing the CNR, at the end of the LTVR Evaluation Period.
11. If the Member of the Executive Committee leaves office, for any reason other than dismissal with just cause, after the end of the evaluation period, but before the LTVR payment, there will be payment in full, corresponding to that evaluation period, with respect to the limits and periods of deferral and composition (shares or Other Instruments) provided for in the Policy.
12. Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the determination of the LTVR final amount shall consider the AVR amount and the limitations provided for in article 8 (16) (17).

Article 11 (Termination of functions before the end of the term of office)

1. A Director who terminates functions before the end of the term of office without being based on resignation or dismissal with just cause, shall be entitled to compensation to

be calculated by the CNR in accordance with article 3 above and the exact amount is to be approved by the CRP after hearing the CAVR.

2. The compensation to be attributed in compliance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not qualify as fixed remuneration, and its payment shall be subject to the signing of a non-competition commitment, for a period corresponding to the term of office in progress at the date of the dismissal.
3. The amounts to be attributed in compliance with the provisions of paragraph 1 may not exceed the overall fixed remuneration that would be due until the end of the term of office, plus, in the case of the Executive Committee Members, an amount corresponding to the average of the AVRs allocated to them in the years in which they have been in office in the mandate in which they cease them.

Article 12 (*Malus* and *Clawback* clauses)

1. The entire variable remuneration, regardless of the acquisition, or not, of vested rights, is subject to reduction or reversion mechanisms whenever it is proven that the Executive Committee Member, with intent or gross negligence, participated in or was responsible for a performance that resulted into significant losses for the Group or ceased to comply with the fit and proper criteria until the date of the last payment of the variable remuneration in the case of the reduction mechanism and up to 3 years after payment of the deferred remuneration in the case of the reversion mechanism.
2. The ability to reduce (*Malus*), totally or partially, the payment of the deferred remuneration and, the payment of which is not yet vested, as well as the return of the variable remuneration paid, the payment of which constitutes a vested right (*Clawback*), is limited to significant events, duly identified, in which the persons covered have had, with intent or gross negligence, an active participation.
3. The reduction or reversion of the variable remuneration should always be related with the performance or the risk and should respond to the effective results of risks or alterations in the continuing risks faced by the Group, the Bank or by the areas of the responsibility of the Executive Committee Member in question and should not be based on the amount of dividends paid or on the evolution of the share price or Other Instruments.
4. The application of the *Clawback* mechanism shall be supplementary to the reduction mechanism; that is, in case of a significant event, the application of the reduction mechanism (*Malus*) shall take priority and only when this is exhausted, is insufficient, or arises from the verification that the Director has significantly contributed to the negative financial performance of the Group or to the application of regulatory sanctions, or in the event of fraud or other serious misconduct or negligence that has caused significant losses, should recourse to the *Clawback* mechanism be considered.
5. In any circumstances, in applying *Malus* or *Clawback* mechanisms, the EBA guidelines which are in force at any given moment shall always be complied with and respected.

6. The occurrence of the situations described in this article is supervised by the CNR and the application of those mechanisms shall be decided after hearing the CRP, the CAVR, the CAUD and the Chairperson of the Board of Directors.

Chapter V - Other Provisions

Article 13 (Benefits)

The Executive Committee Members and the Non-executive Directors exercising functions under an exclusive regime, are entitled to the following benefits:

- i) Health insurance, mobile phone and credit card, in line with what is attributed to other ~~the remaining~~ Bank employees, as well as life insurance, in any case according to the specific responsibilities and functional requirements of each position and equity principles;
- ii) Retirement Supplement.

Article 14 (Retirement pension supplement for disability and old age)

1. The Directors mentioned in the previous article shall benefit from the social security regime applicable in each case.
2. The Directors mentioned in the previous article also have the right to a Retirement Supplement, constituted through capitalisation insurance contracts in which each Director will be the beneficiary.
3. Pursuant to an agreement established with each Director, the capitalisation insurance contract may be replaced by contributions to pension funds with a defined contribution.
4. The annual amount of the Bank's contributions, within the scope of the two previous paragraphs, shall be established by the CRP, after hearing the CNR.
5. The Bank's annual contribution for the plan set forth in the previous paragraph is equal to at least the value, before applying any income tax deductions for individuals, corresponding to 20% and at most the value corresponding to 30% of the annual gross fixed remuneration defined at any given time by the CRP.
6. The Bank shall not bear any additional expenses with the retirement and disability pensions after the termination of each Director's functions.
7. The right to the supplement shall only become effective if the beneficiary retires due to old age or disability, under the terms of the social security regime applicable to him/her.
8. At the time of the effective retirement, the beneficiary may choose to redeem the capital if and to the extent that the contract underlying the alternative chosen by him/her, so allows.

9. If on the retirement date the beneficiary still performs the position that led to the retirement supplement, the plan shall only be activated when the beneficiary ceases the function that entitled him to this benefit.
10. In case of death before retirement, the right to receive the accrued capital shall remain effective pursuant to the applicable provisions established by the contract or by Law.

Article 15 (Pension discretionary benefits)

The ~~attribution~~granting of pension discretionary benefits, based on the Bank's performance or on the individual performance or on any other factors with a discretionary nature is not planned. However, the General Meeting of Shareholders may approve the ~~attribution~~granting of an extraordinary contribution.

Article 16 (Pre-retirement)

The Bank's Employees who have exercised management functions at BCP and who, at the time and within the scope of the termination of these functions, are older than as provided for in the Work Collective Agreement to be able to benefit from the pre-retirement status, may benefit from this status by earning, between the pre-retirement and the effective retirement date, 80% of the average of the 5 higher remunerations of General-Managers of the Bank at the time, having as minimum their last remuneration as employee of the Bank, provided that they have exercised the function of Executive Committee Member for a period equal to or greater than 10 years and that they sign with the Bank a pact of non-competition in the financial sector.

Article 17 (Remuneration earned due to the performance of other functions related with BCP)

1. Considering that the remuneration of the Executive Members of the Board of Directors, as well as the one of the Non-executive Directors exercising functions under an exclusive regime is intended to directly compensate the activities they carry out directly at the Bank or with related companies (namely companies in a control or group relation with BCP) or in Corporate Bodies to which they have been appointed by indication or in representation of the Bank, the net value of the remunerations received annually for such duties by each Executive Member of the Board of Directors and each Non-Executive Member exercising functions under an exclusive regime will be deducted from their respective AFR.
2. It is the obligation and responsibility of each Member of the Board of Directors to inform the Bank of any additional compensation they may have received, for the purposes of complying with the procedure established above.

Article 18 (Insurance)

1. The Members of the Management and Supervisory Bodies must subscribe an

insurance bond in compliance with article 396 of the Companies Code.

2. In addition, the Bank subscribes to a Directors & Officers insurance policy following market practices.

Article 19 (Entry into force)

1. This Policy ~~enters into force~~ is applicable since ~~on~~ 1 January ~~2024~~ 2025.
2. With regard to the instruments used to pay the variable remuneration, the provisions of number 278 of the EBA/GL/2021/04 (EN) relating to Directive 36 of the European Union must be observed, on the date of its ~~attribution~~ granting, regardless of the year to which it relates.

Owner: Human Resources Division

Approval date: xx.05.2025

Approving Body: General Meeting of Shareholders of BCP

Changes to Previous Version: In addition to clarifications of wording and other formal adjustments, changes and reorganization were made to the Basic Principles and Articles 2, 8, 9, 10, and 13.

